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The Radical Uncertainty of Free Exercise Principles: A Comment on Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle1
This paper addresses the decision in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (June 17,
2021), in which a unanimous Supreme Court upheld a claim under the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause by Catholic Social Services (CSS) against the City.
CSS had objected on religious grounds to screening same-sex married couples as
prospective foster parents, despite a provision in its contract with the City that
prohibited such discrimination. Every Justice voted to uphold the Free Exercise Claim.
Only three Justices, however, supported the overruling of the Court’s highly
controversial decision in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), which insulated
religion-neutral, generally applicable policies from free exercise exemption claims.
Three others expressed reservations about that question, and three others remained
entirely silent about it. Smith endures.
Part I of the paper focuses on the veneer of unanimity in Fulton. Unlike in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC (2012), in which the
Court’s unanimity reflected a commitment to deep and abiding church-state principles,
the unanimity in Fulton is a pretext, and a product of radical uncertainty about the
future of free exercise principles.
Part II of the paper analyzes the thickness of the threads by which the Smith
decision hangs. Part II.A. discusses the overwhelming hostility to Smith—not shared
by us – among concerned citizens, elected officials, academics, and many judges over
the past thirty years. Part II.B. criticizes Justice Alito’s lengthy opinion, calling for
Smith to be overruled. He is wrong in his effort to make the law from 1963-1990 the
centerpiece of Free Exercise jurisprudence. His view of the text and history of the Free
Exercise Clause is also wrong, because he assumes that the constitutional concept of
free exercise of religion covered all religiously motivated action. As his sources show,
“free exercise of religion” in the relevant historical period encompassed modes of
worship and religious belief. Part II. C. analyzes the consequences of Alito’s overbroad
The authors are both affiliated with the George Washington University. Ira C. Lupu
is the F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor Emeritus of Law; Robert W. Tuttle is the
David R. and Sherry Kirschner Berz Research Professor of Law and Religion. The
authors filed an amicus brief in Fulton, along with two other religion-law scholars,
Brief of Professors Ira C. Lupu, Frederick Mark Gedicks, William P. Marshall, and
Robert W. Tuttle as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 593 U.S. ____ (2021) (No. 19-123), available
at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19123/150843/20200820163252091_19123%20BRIEF%20OF%20PROFESSORS%20IRA%20C%20LUPU%20ET%20AL.pdf.
We were ably represented in the filing of this amicus brief by David Flugman, Caitlin
Halligan, and other fine lawyers at the law firm of Selendy & Gay PLLC.
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conception of free exercise, and explains why these consequences drove the Smith
decision, as well as the reluctance of Justices Barrett, Kavanaugh, and Breyer to
overturn Smith. Part II.D. analyzes the Court’s recent attempts to narrow the concept
of general applicability in the Covid-19 cases about restrictions on gathering for
worship, and in Fulton itself. These moves, taken to their logical end, effectively undo
Smith. The history of Free Exercise Clause adjudication, however, suggests that neither
the Supreme Court nor the lower courts will take the Free Exercise Clause to the
religion-favoring extremes that this trend invites.
As the Supreme Court’s 2020-21 Term moved into mid-June, many lawyers,
scholars, and concerned citizens waited anxiously for the Court’s disposition of
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia.2 The case involved a conflict between Catholic Social
Services (CSS) of Philadelphia and the City, over whether CSS had a right under the
Free Exercise Clause to refuse to screen same sex married couples for eligibility to
be foster parents. The contract between CSS and the City included requirements of
non-discrimination with respect to sexual orientation of prospective foster parents.
CSS objected to this requirement, claiming that the rule burdened its organizational
religious beliefs that marriage was reserved for unions of one man and one woman.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled in favor of the City.3 A
central premise of its ruling was the ongoing validity of the Supreme Court’s 1990
decision in Employment Division v. Smith,4 which held that the Free Exercise Clause
does not confer rights to religion-based exemptions from laws that are religionneutral and generally applicable to the relevant parties. The Third Circuit agreed
with the City that Smith precluded a constitutional right of exemption from its
prohibition on discrimination against same sex married couples, because all social
welfare agencies (religious or not) in the foster care system had to abide by that
prohibition.
In its certiorari petition,5 Catholic Social Services explicitly urged the Court to
consider whether Smith should be overruled, and the Court included that question
in the grant of review. CSS asserted, as many lawyers had for years, that Smith had
unconstitutionally left religious liberty at the mercy of legislators and government
administrators. Courts, claimed CSS, should play a larger role.
The Supreme Court heard argument in Fulton on the day after Election Day,
2020, just a few days after Justice Amy Coney Barrett took the oath of her new office.
Seven and half months later, the Supreme Court surprised every Court watcher with
593 U. S. ____ (2021) (No. 19-123) (hereafter Fulton) available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf.
3 922 F.3d 140 (2019).
4 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (hereafter cited as Smith).
5 https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19123/108931/20190722174037071_Cert%20Petition%20FINAL.pdf.
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a unanimous decision in favor of CSS. The Court was not unanimous, however, on
the issues involving the content of free exercise principles. Chief Justice Roberts
wrote the Court opinion for six Justices, resting its holding on the narrow and
questionable ground that the City’s non-discrimination policies were not “generally
applicable,” and therefore were outside of the protective ambit of Smith.6 That
conclusion led the Court to apply more rigorous scrutiny to the City’s treatment of
CSS, and the Court determined, with almost no analysis, that the exclusion violated
CSS’s free exercise rights.7
Over the course of two separate opinions, three Justices – Alito, Gorsuch, and
Thomas – concurred in the judgment only. The Gorsuch opinion accused the
majority of disingenuously refusing to engage in the question of whether Smith
should be overruled.8 And Justice Alito, in a sweeping seventy-seven pages, argued
emphatically that Smith should indeed be overruled.9
Justice Roberts’ Court opinion offered no answer to Alito’s extended attack
on Smith. The only answer from anyone in the Court’s majority appeared in a very
brief, concurring opinion by Justice Barrett.10 It was not a surprise that the
appointment of Justice Barrett proved auspicious. Her predecessor, Justice
Ginsburg, had supported the decision in Smith throughout her tenure on the Court.11
Justice Barrett indeed diverged from the Ginsburg line, but not in the ways her
supporters had hoped, or her opponents had feared.
Justice Barrett, joined by Justices Kavanaugh, leaned toward agreement that
the text and structure of the Free Exercise Clause did not support Smith. But her
opinion expressed doubt concerning Alito’s view of the history relevant to the Free
Exercise clause,12 and identified a set of crucial questions, pointedly not answered
by Justice Alito, about the uncertainty that would follow from the overruling of
Smith.13 Justice Barrett saw no reason to leap into the Free Exercise thicket in a case
where all nine Justices agreed that CSS should prevail.
Fulton invites consideration of virtually all the questions and nuances of Free
Exercise law that have occupied judges, lawyers, and scholars for the past three
decades. In the space we have here, we want to highlight several features of Fulton.
Fulton, slip op. at 5.
Id. at 13-15
8 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Gorusch, J., joined by Thomas, J. and Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment only, slip op at 1-11.
9 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Alito, J., joined by Thomas, J. and Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in the judgment only, slip op. at 1-77
10 Barrett, J., concurring, joined by Kavanaugh, J. and in all but the first paragraph by
Breyer, J., slip op. at 1-3.
11 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Archbishop Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
12 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Barrett, J., concurring, slip op at 1.
13 Id. at 1-2.
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As widely noted, the Court was unanimous in the outcome. The City lost, and
CSS won. Unanimity is rare in Religion Clause adjudication, and its causes and
consequences deserve attention. Part I of this Comment compares the last
surprisingly unanimous Religion Clause decision, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,14 with the decision in Fulton. As we will explain,
unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor was wide, deep, and rooted in longstanding Religion
Clause principles. In contrast, unanimity in Fulton was shallow, perhaps even
pretextual, a mask incapable of hiding deep disagreements.
Part II explores the threads by which Smith’s future hangs. Part II.A.
describes the hostile reaction to Smith over the past thirty years in legal, academic,
religious, and political circles. This hostility manifested itself in the briefing in
Fulton, and appeared in full flower in Justice Alito’s concurring opinion.
Part II.B. explains why Justice Alito’s view of the text and history of the Free
Exercise Clause is deeply wrong. The framers of the First Amendment designed the
Clause to protect religious communities from government interference with their
worship practices. Alito’s far broader conception of the Clause as protective of all
religiously motivated practices is at the root of his mistakes.
Part II.C. explores the consequences of his mistaken view. If the Clause
strenuously protects all religiously motivated practices, and if believers get to selfidentify which of their practices are religiously motivated, the Free Exercise Clause
becomes a ticket to override virtually all government policy. Identifying Alito’s
mistakes thus sheds light on why Smith was correct, and why so many people have
trouble seeing that. Our critique of Alito also helps explain why Justices Barrett and
Kavanaugh drew back from embracing his view. Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh
saw, perhaps through a glass darkly, that Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Thomas had no
answer to the questions that inevitably arise from such a broad conception of
religious exercise. In that process of perception lies the salutary story of why the
Court lacked five votes to overrule Smith, and the explanation of why the current
law in some form remains likely to endure.
Part II.D., focusing on the Court’s Covid cases and Fulton itself, explores the
apparent contraction of what qualifies as a law of general applicability. The
questions here are subtle, and deserve attention, because they threaten to
undermine the framework on which Employment Division v. Smith has been built.
I.

Free Exercise of Religion and the Mysteries of Unanimity

Nine years ago, in Hosanna-Tabor, a fully unanimous Court embraced the
“ministerial exception” to laws governing the employment relation. The case
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171
(2012).
14
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involved a fourth grade teacher, Cheryl Perich, who had a ministerial title and some
responsibilities for teaching the faith. After being dismissed, Ms. Perich filed a
lawsuit against her employer, alleging retaliation for seeking civil redress for
discrimination based on disability. The context most assuredly invited a liberal
critique of any legal theory that cut off civil rights claims by employees.
Nevertheless, all nine Justices agreed that Ms. Perich served a ministerial
function within the school, and that both First Amendment Religion Clauses barred
the claim against her employer. The decision rested on a very longstanding
principle, dating to the nineteenth century in American law,15 that courts are
constitutionally incompetent to decide exclusively ecclesiastical questions. The
fitness of a class of persons, or of a particular person, for ministry is such a question.
Accordingly, once a court determines that an employee functions as a minister – that
is, has substantial responsibility for teaching or communicating the faith – any
inquiry into the wrongfulness of her dismissal must end. The matter is for the
religious employer alone.
Every Justice agreed to this basic account, and to the application of the relevant
principles to Cheryl Perich.16 Moreover, and crucial to our account of HosannaTabor, the ministerial exception invites no balancing of interests.17 It operates just
like other Establishment Clause limitations, such as the prohibition on public school
sponsored prayer.18 No state interest, however important or precisely served, can
overcome Establishment Clause limitations.
The refusal to balance interests in ministerial exception cases is made explicit in
Chief Justice Robert’s opinion for the Court.19 This move is highly distinctive in
Religion Clause adjudication. In Free Exercise cases, before and after Smith, the
government’s interest in imposing a restriction is always of relevance. And one can
imagine that an interest balancing approach would matter significantly in a
ministerial exception case. In the case of Cheryl Perich, in particular, her
responsibility for teaching the faith was relatively slight. She did not preach at large
worship gatherings. The government’s side of the ledger, had it counted, would
register the strong interest in barring retaliation against employees who go to
public agencies or courts with discrimination claims. Because some employees are
in positions for which the ministerial character is uncertain, a ruling that they can be
the subject of retaliatory firings deters their complaints and limits rightful
enforcement of the law.
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
We explore in depth what led to unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor in Ira C. Lupu &
Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & School v. EEOC, 20 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1265 (2017) (hereafter Lupu &
Tuttle, The Mystery).
17 Id. at 1276-77.
18 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
19 565 U.S. at 196.
15
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Hosanna-Tabor, therefore, involves unanimity at a level that is wide, deep, and
heavily pedigreed. Its approach covers the adjudication of all exclusively
ecclesiastical questions, whether they involve personnel, property,20 or internal
structures of church governance.21 Courts must abstain from adjudicating these
disputes, and government interests, however strong, play no part in their
resolution.22
This is not a doctrine of free exercise-based church autonomy, in which interests
are uneasily balanced.23 It has a wider base than that – both Religion Clauses. It
also has a narrower ambit – exclusively ecclesiastical questions, rather than the
vaguer notion of internal church affairs.24 And its methodology is categorical. Courts
are wholly incompetent to decide those questions.
Contrast the situation in Fulton, which offers only the veneer of unanimity. First,
the unanimity is in the result, not the reasoning. Six Justices, represented in Chief
Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court, asserted that the relevant norms of nondiscrimination were not generally applicable within the meaning of Smith. This
conclusion rested on the spectacularly specious ground that the Commissioner of
Social Services had discretion, which his office had never exercised, to make
exceptions to the City contract’s requirements of non-discrimination in screening
prospective foster parents. Even though the non-discrimination norms in fact had
been uniformly and consistently applied to every social welfare agency, religious or
secular, the majority hunted for a way to push the case out of the ambit of Smith.
See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
21 See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
22 The Court’s decision in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), offers an occasional
counterweight to the broad idea of “ecclesiastical abstention” reflected in the
ministerial exception. That decision permits courts to decide cases that may be
resolved solely by “secular law.” In the context of employment disputes, the
Supreme Court and lower courts have given little room for that alternative method
of resolving cases. See Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. __
(2020). One important exception to that trend are certain claims of a hostile work
environment based on sex. For discussion, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
#MeToo Meets the Ministerial Exception: Sexual Harassment Claims by Clergy and
the First Amendment’s Religion Clause, 25 Wm. & Mary J. of Gender, Race, and Soc.
Just. 249 (2019).
23 For discussion and critique of a variety of theories of church autonomy, see Lupu
& Tuttle, The Mystery, at 1296-1299, and sources cites therein.
24 In Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), the Court
divided 7-2 on application of the ministerial exception to particular elementary
school teachers, but no Justice rejected the basic principle on which the exception
rests.
20
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Once that was done, the Court still had to determine whether the City’s policy
could survive the strict judicial review that followed. In a remarkably superficial
passage, the majority reasoned that the very possibility of exceptions meant that the
government’s interest in denying exceptions could not be sufficiently important.25
As anyone can see, it is utterly unpersuasive to diminish the City’s interest in
denying exceptions to non-discrimination norms by the never-exercised power to
grant such exceptions. Something explains this thin and weak reasoning, but none
of the Justices makes the attempt.
The three Justices who did not join the Court opinion had a ready explanation for
the Court’s maneuvers. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Alito and Thomas, attacked the
majority’s reasoning on the general applicability of Philadelphia’s nondiscrimination norms. He asserted, with good cause, that the majority had gone far
beyond the bounds of normal legal reasoning to find a way not to address the attack
on Smith, which the Court in its certiorari grant had agreed to entertain.
Justice Alito, joined by Gorsuch and Thomas, accepted the invitation with gusto, and
concluded that Smith should be overruled.
So, unlike in Hosanna-Tabor, where all nine Justices accepted the essential
premises of ecclesiastical abstention and its lesser included element of the
ministerial exception, Fulton revealed extreme tension among groups of Justices
about the basic premises that underlie the free exercise guaranty. Moreover, this
unanimity of result, coupled with the obvious tension between the Alito-GorsuchThomas group and all the others, has produced understandable speculation about
the initial assignment of the opinion, and possible migration of the Justices during
the opinion writing process.26
We believe that the initial line-up of the Justices contained three groups –
three (Alito-Gorsuch-Thomas) who were eager to both overrule Smith and rule for
CSS; three (Roberts-Kavanaugh-Barrett) who were willing to rule for CSS but
reluctant or unwilling to overrule Smith; and three (Breyer-Kagan-Sotomayor) who
were inclined to rule for the City under the existing case law. The questions from

Fulton, slip op. at 13-15. For discussion of the superficiality of the Court’s
treatment of this question, see Holly Hollman, “Court Requires Religious Exemption
But Leaves Many Questions Unanswered,”
https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/06/court-requires-religious-exemption-butleaves-many-questions-unanswered/.
26 See Josh Blackman, Was There a Double Flip in the November Sitting,
https://reason.com/volokh/2021/06/17/was-there-a-double-flip-in-thenovember-sitting/ (speculating that the initial assignment of Fulton was to Alito,
and the initial assignment of Texas v. California, cite, eventually authored by Breyer,
was to Roberts).
25
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the Justices at oral argument are consistent with this appraisal.27 If these divisions
held, there would have been no majority opinion. We would have had a splintered
three-three-three ruling. CSS would have won, and the opinion for the Roberts
group would have been the narrowest opinion in support of the result, and
therefore would have been controlling.
All this suggests that somewhere along the way, a deal was struck to
eliminate any dissenting opinions. In exchange, the likely dissenters got a very
narrow Court opinion that resolved none of the deeper questions about conflicts
between religious freedom and anti-discrimination law as it protects LGBT persons.
Highly questionable arguments drove the Court’s decision that the City’s
policies were not generally applicable. The opinion refers to a provision (section
3.21) in the City’s standard contract with agencies that provide foster care services
to the effect that those agencies, including CSS, will not “reject . . . prospective foster
parents . . . based on their race, ethnicity, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender
identity, religion, [or] national origin unless an exception is granted by the
Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee, in his/her sole discretion.”28 This
grant of discretion, the Court reasons, invites case-by-case exceptions, and therefore
destroys the general applicability of the anti-discrimination norm.29
Although Smith itself had suggested that, in the unemployment context, a
regime of discretionary exceptions for “good cause” should not be viewed as
generally applicable,30 that context is one in which such exceptions are routine and
on-going. Once “good cause” exceptions are made, the scheme no longer applies to
all parties in the same way. In contrast, the City Commissioner in Philadelphia
had never made an exception under 3.21 for discrimination on forbidden grounds
against prospective foster parents, and the City asserted that the Commissioner
lacked authority under other provisions of the contract and under local law to make
such exceptions.31 So, as a matter of consistent practice, the City treated the nondiscrimination norm with respect to prospective foster parents as generally
See the analysis of the oral argument in Fulton by Amy Howe of Scotus Blog here:
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/11/argument-analysis-justices-sympathetic-tofaith-based-foster-care-agency-in-anti-discrimination-dispute/
28 Fulton, slip op. at 7; Supplemental Appendix to City Respondents’ Brief on the
Merits at SA16, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U. S. ____ (2021) (No. 19-123),
available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19123/150998/20200821180751632_19123%20Supplemental%20Appendix%20to%20City%20Respondents%20Brief.pdf.
29 Fulton, slip op. at 8.
30 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
31 Brief for City Respondents at 31, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U. S. ____
(2021) (No. 19-123), available
at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19123/150122/20200813151746678_19-123%20Respondents%20Brief.pdf.
27

8

applicable. Notably, this argument about discretion played almost no part in the
presentation by CSS to the Court, and yet it wound up at the heart of the majority
opinion.32
The emphasis in the Court opinion on the contract, which Philadelphia can
revise, reveals that unanimity in Fulton is Court-wide and an inch deep. The absence
of any rigor in applying the standard of review confirms that assessment. Justices
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer may well have believed that the City’s interests in
avoiding stigmatic injury to same sex couples, and material injury to LGBT children
in need of placement, were sufficiently compelling to justify denial of an exemption
from conditions of public service. Obviously, they did not say so. On any plausible
accounting of the concerns of individual Justices, unanimity in Fulton is a
translucent veneer.
II.

The Struggle over First Principles of Free Exercise

It is easy to forget that the core protections of the Free Exercise Clause
remain solid and unchallenged. The government may not target for regulation or
prohibition the content of worship by a particular faith. That content, historically a
feature of regulation in England,33 involves exclusively ecclesiastical questions,
about which a secular government has no legitimate interest.

The other, even less plausible argument rested on the Court’s aggressive
reconstruction of City’s Fair Practices Ordinance, which prohibits discrimination in
“public accommodations opportunities” based on (among other grounds) an
individual’s sexual orientation, constituted a relevant, generally applicable law.
Fulton, slip op. at 10–13. The Court construed the Ordinance as not covering foster
parenting as a “public accommodation,” because the relevant service of certification
as a foster parent involved a high degree of selectivity. Whatever the merits of this
reading, which we doubt, the Court’s adoption of it flew in the face of carefully
reasoned contrary findings by both the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Both had proximity
to local law, and both had determined that the Fair Practices Ordinance does indeed
cover the opportunity to serve as a foster parent. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,
320 F. Supp. 3d 661, 677 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (stating that “the Parties’ intent that the
Fair Practices Ordinance apply to CSS’s services is manifest by the clear and
unequivocal terms of the Services Contract”); 922 F.3d 140, 148 (applying the Fair
Practices Ordinance to foster parents).
33 See, e.g., Act of Uniformity, 14 Charles II c.4 (1662) (requiring all preachers,
professors and teachers to take an oath affirming the theology and liturgy of the
Anglican Book of Common Prayer, on pain of losing their position).
32

9

The fights over free exercise rights in the 20th and 21st century, however, are
rarely about that core.34 Instead, the fights are about general laws and policies that
do not target specific faiths but have an impact on religiously motivated practices
outside of worship.35 Fulton presents a paradigm example. The City of Philadelphia
did not direct the Archdiocese of Philadelphia to make available the sacrament of
marriage to same sex couples. Entitlement to that sacrament is entirely within the
province of each faith community. Rather, the City prohibited discrimination among
lawfully married couples in the certification of potential foster parents. That is a
public project, publicly regulated, and publicly financed. The City was advancing the
interests of its people, not targeting Catholics or others for their view of marriage.
A. The Near-Silence in Defense of Smith
As Part I of this paper suggests, the fights within the Court over the past,
present, and future of free exercise principles remain open and fierce. One puzzling
aspect of these fights is the attitude of the current Justices toward the correctness of
Employment Division v. Smith. When Justice Kennedy retired, the last of the five
Justices who joined in Smith left the Court. We know that at least three current
Justices want to overrule it, and at least two more are somewhat skeptical of it. Of
the other four, not one has publicly embraced Smith.
Moreover, the reticence on the Court to defend Smith is mirrored in the
larger society of scholars, lawyers, and concerned citizens. From the beginning,
Smith has taken intense critical fire, on a variety of grounds.36 The Court’s most
liberal members at the time, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, vigorously
dissented in Smith.37 Critics have asserted that Smith is wrong as a matter of textual
interpretation and original understanding.38 They have offered versions of
constitutional history to undermine it.39 They assert that it cannot be squared with

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)(hereafter
cited as Lukumi) is a rare exception, because it involved a bundle of regulations that
targeted the worship practice of animal sacrifice by the Santerians.
35 Smith itself, as well as the RFRA decision in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (hereafter cited as O Centro) both
involved generally applicable, non-targeted policies that had an impact on
sacramental practices.
36 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1;
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1109 (1990).
37 Smith, 494 U.S. at 907-921 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting). In Fulton, Justice Alito’s opinion canvasses the many Justices who have
expressed disagreement with Smith. Fulton, Alito slip op. 10-11.
38 See Alito, J., concurring in the judgment, slip op at 29, n.34.
39 See sources cited at id.
34
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precedent, or with the Court’s treatment of other First Amendment rights.40 And
they bewail the Court’s pronouncement of the Smith rule without warning to
litigants that a major departure from prior decisions was being considered.41
These criticisms originally came from the right, left, and center of the
ideological spectrum. The coalition that organized the push for the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)42 included representatives from all of these
perspectives and included the voice of highly respected civil liberties
organizations.43 The Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 by a nearly unanimous vote.
We have noticed over many years that political actors, like Governors, state
Attorneys General, and city officials are reluctant or unwilling to defend Smith,
because so many religious people and institutions have long criticized it.
In the period since about 2000, claims that religious freedom justifies refusal
to serve same sex couples have engendered tremendous and intense opposition,44
but rarely was that opposition framed as a defense of Smith. Instead, the arguments
took the form of asserting that the government has a compelling interest in
eradicating LGBT discrimination, and thus would prevail even if Smith were
overruled.
Fulton proceeded in the Supreme Court along these lines. The grant of
certiorari in Fulton explicitly invited the Court to revisit Smith. As one would expect,
the briefs for Catholic Social Services and many of its amici strenuously urged the
Court to overrule Smith. Nevertheless, the City of Philadelphia and many of its amici
See Stephanie Barclay & Mark Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied
Challenges? A Defense of Religious Exemptions, 59 Boston College L. Rev. 1595
(2018). Bill Marshall was an early, contrary, and important voice in defending Smith
on the grounds that it respected the equality of religious and non-religious speech.
William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 308 (1991). Justice Alito made no effort to answer Professor Marshall’s quite
persuasive argument.
41 Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.
42 42 USC §2000bb – 2000bb-4.
43 See Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
62 Fordham L. Rev. 883, 895-96 (1994). See also Fulton, Alito slip op. at 19 (noting
then Rep. Schumer’s Introduction of the bill that became RFRA, and President
Clinton’s signing of it).
44 The leading cases include Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, 594 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017); and Arlene’s Flowers v.
Washington, 443 P.3d 1203 (Wa. 2019), cert. denied, xxx S. Ct. xxx (No, 19-333 July
2, 2021). See also Brush & Nib Studio LLC v. City of Phoenix, 247 Ariz. 269 (2019).
For a sample of the commentary, pro and con, on the Masterpiece Cakeshop
litigation and result, see the Scotusblog coverage here:
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-vcolorado-civil-rights-commn/.
40
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only avoided the question. They argued instead that, even if Smith was wrong,
courts should reject claims of religious freedom to discriminate based on sex or
sexual orientation.
In the Fulton briefing, we played the role of sore thumb. Together with
Professors William Marshall and Frederick Gedicks, we filed a brief on the side of
the City, arguing that Smith is correct and should be reaffirmed.45 All four of us
understand that the regime of Smith can be insensitive to religious minorities, but
we still believe that, all things considered, Smith is better than any other proposed
approach to religious accommodations. By our count, there were only three other
briefs that explicitly argued for retention of Smith.46 Among the forty-seven amicus
briefs filed on behalf of the City,47 the authors of forty-four chose to ignore that
question.
Despite that overwhelming quantitative imbalance, the majority of the Court
resisted the urging to overrule Smith. Thirty years of political and scholarly
criticism, extended and repeated legislative efforts to overturn the decision, and
briefing heavily stacked in one direction in Fulton convinced only three Justices.
Three Justices expressed considerable reticence about replacing Smith, and three
others remained silent on the question. Something, not yet in view, explains the
reluctance or unwillingness of six Justices to overrule Smith.
B. The Deep Flaws in Justice Alito’s Critique of Smith
Justice Alito’s opinion, which ranges over the entire waterfront of
constitutional argument – text, structure of the First Amendment, 19th century
Brief of Professors Ira C. Lupu, Frederick Mark Gedicks, William P. Marshall, and
Robert W. Tuttle as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 593 U.S. ____ (2021) (No. 19-123), cited in note 1, supra.
46 Professor Eugene Volokh filed a brief on behalf of neither side,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19123/144677/20200602140011707_19123%20Amicus%20Brief%20Professor%20Volokh.pdf (arguing that the Court
should not overrule Smith, and applauding statutory schemes, such as RFRA, that
authorize religious exemptions). On the side of Philadelphia, only two briefs besides
ours urged a reaffirmation of Smith. One, from the National League of Cities and
other organizations concerned with municipal government, stressed the
detrimental impact on their operations that overruling would produce,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19123/150736/20200820113756441_19-123%20%20Amici%20FINALe-filed.pdf
The other was from the Freedom from Religion Foundation and other atheist
organization, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19123/150812/20200820151727143_Brief.pdf.
47 All of the amicus briefs filed in Fulton are available here:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/19-123.html.
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history of religious freedom in the U.S., and an evaluation of the relevant precedent
– is riddled with false narratives, internal contradictions, and errors of history. No
one on the Court tried to answer his opinion in full, but unanswered is not the same
as correct.
From the outset, Alito’s aggressive effort to shape the narrative leads him
astray. He promises a “fresh look at what the Free Exercise Clause demands.”48 Two
sentences later, reviewing the law as it stood at the time of Smith (1990), he asserts
that Sherbert (1963) “had been in place for nearly four decades when Smith was
decided.”49 A page later, he re-asserts that the Sherbert test provided the governing
rule in free exercise cases for “the next 37 years.”50 We are certain his skill at
arithmetic is better than this, but we cannot help but notice the direction of his
error, exaggerating the Sherbert rule’s longevity.
More broadly, his focus on the period from Sherbert to the eve of Smith as the
place to begin a “fresh look” at the demands of the Free Exercise Clause is highly
revealing. He might logically have begun with the text and history of the Clause. Or,
he might have started with the Supreme Court’s first major engagement with the
Clause in Reynolds v. United States51 (1878), which rejected the idea that the Clause
privileged religiously motivated action (in that case, plural marriage). Instead, he
emphasizes the period between 1963-1990 as a way to paint a narrative in which
Sherbert-Yoder is normative, and Smith is an aberration.
His account, however, is quite backwards. Our amicus brief in Fulton more
accurately described the flow of Free Exercise jurisprudence from 1878 onward.52
The Court had consistently rejected claims of free exercise exemptions until the
early 1960’s.53 Only in the period from the early 1960’s to 1990 did the Court
Fulton, Alito, J. concurring in the judgment, at 11.
Id. at 11-12.
50 Id. at 13. As best we can determine from the opinions posted at supremecourt.gov,
neither error had been corrected of July 10, 2021.
51 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Although Justice Alito repudiates the Free Exercise approach
taken in Reynolds, Alito slip op. at 55, he coyly asserts that his “discussion does not
suggest that Reynolds should be overruled.” Id., at note 75. Why not? What
compelling interest is served by denying an exemption from anti-bigamy laws to
consenting adults who enter a plural marriage for religious reasons? Moves like this
are an excellent reminder of the endless possibility of manipulation of strict scrutiny
in Free Exercise exemption cases.
52 Brief of Professors Ira C. Lupu, Frederick Mark Gedicks, William P. Marshall, and
Robert W. Tuttle as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, note 1 supra, at pp. 7-16. For a related but not identical treatment of
the arc of Free Exercise law, see James M. Oleske, Free Exercise (Dis)honesty, 2019
Wisc. L. Rev. 689.
53 This rejection included Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940),
which denied a claim by Jehovah’s Witness children that the Free Exercise Clause
48
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purport to apply the compelling interest test to any claims of religious exemption.
Moreover, as we explain later in this section, even in that period the Court
frequently worked around that test.
The most accurate description of free exercise exemption claims through
history is that the Court denied all of them between 1878 and 1963; appeared
occasionally sympathetic to them from 1963-1990; and then again repudiated them
under the Smith rule from 1990 onward. By our count, that would be a total of 116
years in which free exercise exemptions were not constitutionally mandatory, and
27 years in which, quite sporadically, such claims succeeded. The period of
Sherbert-Yoder was the aberration. Smith returned the law of the Free Exercise
Clause to normalcy.
Justice Alito’s other errors are more subtle, but hardly less conspicuous to
the careful reader. Time after time, his own footnotes contradict his case.
Start with his account of the text. Justice Alito claims that he will analyze the
“normal and ordinary” meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.54 One of his first moves
in searching for that meaning is to claim that the word “religion” requires no
discussion for purposes of this case.55 At that point, he drops a quite extraordinary
footnote, which reads: “Whatever the outer boundaries of the term ‘religion’ as used
in the First Amendment, there can be no doubt that CSS’s contested policy
represents an exercise of ‘religion.’”56 Justice Alito sets out to prove that the
exercise of religion includes the posture of CSS toward same sex couples, and he
starts his analysis by assuming that the practice is included! But this is a matter
open to serious historical doubt, as Justice Alito’s own sources strongly indicate.
Justice Alito’s turn to eighteenth century dictionaries illustrates the
embarrassing gap between the text and the citations he uses to support the text. He
notes, with multiple sources, that the term “exercise” had both a broad primary
entitled them to an exemption from the duty to salute the American flag in school.
When West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) overruled
Gobitis, it did so on the ground that the speech clause protected all school children
from compulsion to salute the flag, regardless of their reason for objection. See
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634-635 & n. 15. We put the Flag salute story in a wider
perspective in Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Secular Government, Religious People
(Eerdmans Pub. Co, 2014) at 183-187. In Alito’s telling of the Flag Salute story, he
distorts the narrative to make it seem as if Barnette rested on the religious beliefs of
the children. Alito at 53-55.
54 Id. at 21. Alito has lengthy footnotes explaining broad departures from “normal
and ordinary” meaning of “Congress,” id. at 21, n. 27, and “no law abridging the
freedom of speech,” id. at 23, n. 28. Apparently, “normal and ordinary” can become
quite extraordinary and abnormal in judicial hands.
55 Id. at 23.
56 Id. at 23, n. 29.
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definition (“[p]ractice” or “outward performance”) and a narrower secondary one
(an “[a]ct of divine worship whether publick or private”).57 Which of these should
control the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause? The first appears to be its
non-specific use as “practice or performance,” as in musical exercise. The second,
however, appears in connection with religion and has a singular meaning: “Act of
divine worship.”58 As we explain further below, this religion-centered definition
coincides perfectly with what late eighteenth century Americans understood as the
exercise of religion.
How does Justice Alito escape the conclusion that a worship-centered
definition of religious exercise should control the meaning of the Constitution? He
turns, briefly and parenthetically, to precedent from the middle of the 20th Century –
in particular, Cantwell v. Connecticut.59 This is just sleight of hand in a number of
ways. First, the Cantwell opinion, penned in 1940, makes absolutely no reference to
the original meaning of the First Amendment. It thus carries no weight as an
originalist interpretation. Second, the context of Cantwell is street preaching by
members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. This is dissemination of the word of God, and
may fall within the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. Even if that
conclusion is correct, however, it does not come close to proving that all religiously
motivated conduct should qualify as religious exercise within the “normal and
ordinary” meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. Alito is cheating in his textualist
story, and even the cheating does not get him where he wants to go.60
The best reading of Justice Alito’s footnotes belies his assertion that CSS’s
practice involves the exercise of religion. On narrow, dictionary-driven textualist
grounds, the phrase “Free Exercise of Religion” should be limited to acts of worship,
and (as we explain below) the closely related practices of public preaching and
proselytizing.
Justice Alito’s analysis of constitutional history reveals the same tendentious
qualities as his analysis of text. The relevant history fully supports the notion that
“exercise of religion” referred to acts of worship, and certainly did not encompass all
Id. at 24 n. 31.
Id.
59 310 U. S. 296 (1940). At page 24 of his Fulton opinion, Alito writes “(The Court
long ago declined to give the First Amendment’s reference to “exercise” this narrow
reading. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303–304 (1940).)” Fulton,
Alito slip op. at 24. This is the entirety of his explanation of why the original
meaning of “free exercise of religion” extends beyond acts of Divine worship.
60 Cantwell rests on freedom of speech, id. at310 U.S. at 307-311, as well as free
exercise of religion, so it becomes less important to decide if street preaching is such
an exercise. Jesse Cantwell would have been equally protected by the First
Amendment if he had been engaged in political or social advocacy, unrelated to
religion.
57
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religiously motivated conduct. Once again, the footnotes sharply contradict Justice
Alito’s assertions in the text.
Justice Alito traces “free exercise” back to an act by the Maryland Assembly in
1649 and says that by 1789 “every State except Connecticut had a constitutional
provision protecting religious liberty.”61 On the sound assumption that the federal
Free Exercise Clause reflects the widespread pattern of such protections,62 Justice
Alito’s originalist argument rests on his reading of those state constitutional
provisions.
Here, however, his argument goes off the rails. Instead of analyzing the
content of religious liberty encompassed by those constitutional provisions, Justice
Alito focuses solely on a limitation frequently imposed on that liberty. Many state
constitutions expressly provided that the right of religious liberty does not protect
conduct that would endanger “the public peace” or “safety.”63 “If, as Smith held,”
Justice Alito writes, “the free-exercise right does not require any religious
exemptions from generally applicable laws, it is not easy to imagine situations in
which a public-peace-or-safety carve out would be necessary.”64
Once again, Justice Alito goes out of his way to avoid the core question.
Instead of stressing the importance of carve-outs, Justice Alito should first and
foremost have attended to the substance of religious liberty itself.
Even a cursory reading of Justice Alito’s long footnote, cataloguing state
constitutional guaranties in the founding period, shows that these provisions
focused exclusively on freedom of worship and belief.65
To take just one example, the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution read: “It is
the right as well as the duty of all men in society, publickly, and at stated seasons, to
worship the SUPREME BEING, the Great Creator and Preserver of the Universe. And
no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for
worshipping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his
own conscience; or for his religious profession or sentiments; provided he doth not
disturb the publick peace, or obstruct others in their religious worship.”
Fulton, Alito slip op. at 30-31, citing Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1410, 1445 (1990).
62 Donald S. Lutz, The State Constitutional Pedigree of the U.S. Bill of Rights, 22
Publius, Spring 1992, at 19-20, 27-29.
63 Justice Alito lists many such provisions in his Fulton concurrence, See Fulton,
Alito, J., at p. 34, note 43.
64 Id. at 36.
65 Id. at 34-35, n. 43. ADD Northwest Ordinance? See also JAMES H. HUTSON, CHURCH
AND STATE IN AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES 137 (2007) (“On one subject there
was unanimity: Governments must not interfere in the spiritual realm, in men’s
beliefs and modes of worship.”)
61
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The concern for public order in the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution derives
from the threat of unruly forms of worship,66 not from the broader category of all
religiously motivated conduct. The Massachusetts provision echoes other state
constitutions. All locate the right in worship, and many extend it to religious
“profession or sentiments.”67
The history of mid-18th century religious conflict in the colonies provides the
context necessary to fully understand the references to peace and order. The First
Great Awakening brought widespread religious revivals throughout the colonies. 68
Many of the revivalists were itinerant preachers who faced hostility from some
“settled” clergy (those who had congregations) over doctrinal and practical
differences.69 These itinerant preachers, foremost among them George Whitefield,
preached theatrical sermons, calling for believers to experience a “new birth” of
Christ in their hearts. According to these preachers, this new birth is necessary to
avoid the very real peril of hell, which they described in vivid detail.70 The sermons
led some listeners to collapse, others to speak in tongues, and still others to cry out
in fear for their souls. This type of worship stood in sharp contrast to the learned
sermons and staid services of Congregationalist clergy in New England, or Anglican
priests in the southern colonies.71

The central challenge for church-state policies during this period arose from a
half-century of exploding diversity within Protestantism. Evangelicalism – reflected
in the “First Great Awakening” – challenged traditional forms of religiosity from
New England’s Congregationalists to Virginia’s Anglicans. Evangelicalism focused
on a religion of the heart, rather than one directed primarily at adherence to creeds
or ritual practices. This shift splintered congregations and denominations, while
creating or greatly expanding the reach of “dissenting” faith communities
(Methodists and Baptists in particular). Although some clergy welcomed the
religious vitality of this piety, many others expressed deep concern that its disdain
for the settled religious order threatened the peace of the civil community. See
generally, Frances Fitzgerald, The Evangelicals: The Struggle to Shape America 1324 (2017); James H. Hutson, Church and State in America: The First Two Centuries
73-92 (2008); Thomas S. Kidd, The Great Awakening: The Roots of Evangelical
Christianity in Colonial America (2007); Patricia U. Bonomi, Under the Cope of
Heaven: Religion, Society and Politics in Colonial America 123-167 (rev. ed. 2003);
Mark Noll, The Rise of Evangelicalism: The Age of Edwards, Whitefield and the
Wesleys (2003).
67 See Fulton, Alito slip op at 32 n.38.
68 See infra note 66 and the sources cited there.
69 Hutson, supra note 66, at Kidd, supra note 66, passim; Bonomi, supra note 66, at
129-160; Noll, supra note 66, at 128-132, 149-150.
70 Kidd, supra not 66, at chs. 4-5; Bonomu, supra note 66, at 157-159.
71 Fitzgerald, supra note 66, at 21; Hutson, supra note 66, at 77-79; Bunomi, supra
not 66, at 142, 150.
66
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Many ministers and others objected to the “wild” form of religiosity, which
they found to be more spectacle than divine worship. Others feared that they would
lose their congregants to the itinerant preachers. And still others resented the
question from congregants or itinerant preachers about whether the settled
ministers had received the “new birth.”72
In the years before the Revolution, some colonial legislatures attempted to
protect the interests of settled ministers by restricting the activities of itinerant
ministers. Virginia made the most intense effort by requiring all preachers to obtain
a license from a board of Anglican clergy.73 James Madison wrote that he was
greatly affected by the sight of Baptist evangelists jailed for violating the act.74
Conflicts over these evangelical revivals fully explain the carve-outs that
Justice Alito finds so important. Even if a state constitutional provision protected
the right of itinerant preachers to offer a public worship service – often held outside,
because towns or settled clergy regularly denied them the use of a church – the
concern remained that worshippers might disturb public peace and order.75
By focusing only on the carve-out, Justice Alito ignores the interpretive
question at the heart of any serious textualist or originalist inquiry: what did the
“free exercise of religion” mean at the Founding? Justice Alito simply assumes the
conclusion he wants to reach and ignores obvious contradictory evidence. That
evidence shows that the constitutional understanding of religious exercise, at the
Founding, is far removed from the religiously motivated moral conduct of CSS.
Justice Alito’s stipulation that CSS’s policies are religious exercise, within the
original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, is wrong.76

Kidd, supra note 66, at ch. 5; Noll, supra note 66, at 129-130 (on Gilbert Tennent’s
1740 “The Danger of an Unconverted Ministry”).
73 Hutson, supra note 66, at 82-89; Bunomi, supra note 66, at 181-184.
74 Hutson, supra note 66, at 90.
75 Kidd, supra note 66, chs. 5-7; Bunomi, supra note 66, at 147-149
76 Legislatures remained free, at the time of the Founding and still today, to
accommodate religious concerns that lay beyond the constitutional guaranty of free
exercise of religion. The most famous and obvious example is that of the Quakers,
who refused to swear oaths, and refused to bear arms in defense of themselves or
their communities. Laws that excused Quakers from oath requirements,
conscription, or militia duty recognized their concerns of religious conscience, but
the constitutions (state and federal) did not require that. Justice Alito recites the
story of legislative accommodations of Quakers and other sects at pp. 40-42, but he
insists that these measures are evidence that the constitution required such
exemptions. Justice Scalia correctly saw them as permissive, and not constitutionally
mandatory. City of Boerne v. Archbishop Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 541 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
72
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This is not the place to fully develop an alternative account of the text and
history of the “free exercise of religion.” We can, however, sketch one that is much
more plausible than that offered by Alito. This alternative starts with the 1689 Act
of Toleration,77 which granted most dissenting Protestant communities the right to
worship and hold beliefs that differed significantly from the practices and doctrines
of the Church of England. The Act required dissenting Protestants to take an oath of
allegiance to the Crown and confirm their belief in certain doctrines of the faith,
most prominently the Holy Trinity and the divine inspiration of the Bible. But it
allowed them to worship in their own congregations and according to their own
beliefs about baptism, communion, and church order – doctrines that had been at
the heart of most disputes between the dissenters and the Church of England.78 The
Act also denied protection to any worship that threatened public peace or order – a
clause that many state constitutions retained after Independence.
During the 18th Century, dissenting Protestant communities in the American
colonies frequently invoked the rights granted by the Act of Toleration. Although
many colonial governments complied with the provisions, or even offered much
broader liberties for worship,79 others resisted.80 At first, Massachusetts even
refused to permit Anglican missionaries and churches, but the Crown soon ended
that recalcitrance.81 Virginia proved the most obstinate opponent of the Act. As late
as the Revolutionary Era, Virginia’s government denied that the Act applied to the
colony. Licensing authorities almost uniformly refused to permit dissenting
ministers to preach or form congregations in Virginia. 82

1 Will. & Mary c.18. See Hutson, supra note 66, at 48-56
Notably, however, the Act required ministers of dissenting congregations to
obtain licenses from the local magistrate, register their place of worship with the
local Anglican bishop, and keep the doors to their place of worship open during any
meetings of the congregation. The Act granted no right of religious liberty to Roman
Catholics or Unitarians. And it required all subjects to attend some place of worship
on the Sabbath. Id. See Ellis M. West, The Free Exercise of Religion: Its Original
Constitutional Meaning 44 (2019).
79 Rhode Island (Roger Williams) and Pennsylvania (William Penn) were founded by
strident advocates of religious liberty and incorporated general provisions for
freedom of worship and belief into their founding documents. Nicolas P. Miller, The
Religious Roots of the First Amendment: Dissenting Protestants and the Separation
of Church and State 60-63 (2012).
80 West, supra note 78, at 46; Miller, supra note 79, at 101; Hutson, supra note 66, at
79-81; Bunomi, supra note 66, at 66, 164-166.
81 In 1691, The Crown granted a new Royal Charter for Massachusetts, which
incorporated the Act of Toleration. Bunomi, supra note 66, at 61. The colony,
however, maintained a restrictive practice of funding for recognized religious
congregations. Hutson, supra note 66, at 81-82.
82 Hutson, supra note 66, at 82-90; Bunomi, supra note 66, at 181-185.
77
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The liberty sought by these dissenting Protestant faiths, then, focused on the
rights of worship and public preaching.83 As their rhetoric shifted from toleration to
religious freedom, the groups sought equality with whatever denomination enjoyed
favored status in the colony. Laws that required licensing of dissenting clergy or
registration of religious meeting houses failed the test of equality.84
The debate over public funding for ministers or houses of worship is the
closest potential analogy for modern arguments for religious exemptions.
Opponents of such funding, particularly Baptists, argued that the imposition of
religious taxation treated them unequally (because they refused to provide or
receive any compelled support) and impermissibly involved the state in matters
outside the scope of its temporal authority.85 The dissenting arguments blocked
efforts to impose religious taxes in some states (most notably Virginia)86 but failed
in others (primarily Connecticut and Massachusetts.)87
Theophilus Parsons, a drafter of the Massachusetts Constitution, later
justified the taxation of dissenters by distinguishing between the spiritual and civil
functions of religion.88 All are free to believe, worship, or publicly preach according
to their faith. But state support for certain Protestant faiths is proper because
instruction in core Protestant doctrines – especially belief in a future state of
rewards and punishments – will produce citizens who are more likely to obey laws
and public morality. Such funding serves the purely civil function of ensuring peace
and order and benefits even those who do not seek or qualify for state funding of
their ministries.89
The 18th century history thus suggests (in accord with Justice Alito’s
citations) that “exercise of religion” focused on belief, worship, and public
preaching. It does not support his conclusion that the “exercise of religion”
encompasses any act that claimants believe is required by their faith. The
Massachusetts example proves most telling: the law protects the “spiritual” domain,

Hutson, supra note 66, at 90 (“Large numbers of Virginians … were comfortable
with the definition of liberty of conscience that had been popularized by eighteenthcentury British dissenters: freedom from forcible interference with public worship
coupled with acquiescence in state intervention in other aspects of religion.”) (The
quote focuses specifically on Presbyterians, however, who received significantly
better treatment in Virginia than Baptists. See id. at 87.
84 Id. at 91-92. See also West, supra note 78, at 85-86.
85 Miller, supra note 79, at 106-108.
86 West, supra note 78, at 62-67; Miller, supra note 79, at 144-147; Hutson, supra
note 66, at 117, 121-125.
87 See 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, Articles II and III.
88 Barnes v. Inhabitants of the First Church of Falmouth, 6 Mass. 401 (1810).
89 Id. at 408-410.
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not a pluralistic idea of religiously motivated conduct in the civil or secular
domain.90
We recognize that this Protestant-centered “exercise of religion” fails to
respect the beliefs and practices of many religious adherents in our pluralist
nation.91 We do not argue that this interpretation is the best normative reading of
the Free Exercise Clause.92 Instead, the argument we are making is that the
constitution drafters of the 18th century understood the restriction on laws
“prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” as a barrier to government interference
with worship, and perhaps with preaching the Word through religious instruction
and proselytizing. The drafters’ meaning takes on immeasurably greater
importance as the society became more religiously pluralistic. Reaching beyond the
original constitutional limits to protect all religiously motivated conduct in a
pluralistic society is unmanageable. As Justice Scalia in Smith explained: “ . . .
because we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury
of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every
regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.”93
Justice Alito makes yet one more, all too common mistake in his analysis. He
complains that Smith made the Free Exercise Clause into “essentially an anti-

Our account of the 18th Century history and meaning of the Free Exercise Clause is
buttressed by Professor Rakove’s excellent recent study of the subject. Jack N.
Rakove, Beyond Belief, Beyond Conscience: The Radical Significance of the Free
Exercise of Religion (Oxford U. Press 2020). See especially chaps. 2-3.
91 This failure simply demonstrates the inadequacy of originalist interpretation –
and the inevitable temptation to shape that interpretation to support a desired
outcome. Peter J. Smith, Originalism and Level of Generality, 51 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 10
(noting that in practice the application of originalism "appears ad hoc, largely
unconstrained, and thus susceptible to the same kind of results-oriented decisionmaking that originalists have long decried"). The same should be said of the Court’s
emphasis on “history and tradition” as the basis for denying that government
displays and religious speech – which invariably reflect Christian beliefs – violate
the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n,
588 U.S. ___ (2019) (upholding display of Latin Cross as a secular memorial to those
who died serving the U.S. in World War I); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565
(2014) (upholding a pattern of predominantly Christian prayer to open Town
Council meetings)
92 See generally West, supra note 78 (arguing that the best originalist interpretation
of the Free Exercise Clause limits the scope of its protection to a domain of “religious
worship and practice” that is distinct from civil authority’s power over laws
“protecting and promoting the earthly wellbeing of persons”. Id. at 197.).
93 494 U.S. at 888. This statement is followed by a long list of the categories of law
that would be vulnerable to exemption claims under Alito’s approach. Id. at 889.
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discrimination provision.”94 Although it is correct to say that both the
Establishment Clause95 and the Free Exercise Clause96 have anti-discrimination
components, Smith goes beyond this and recognizes the Clause as protecting the
right to choose forms of worship. As Justice Scalia wrote, “It would doubtless be
unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of ‘statues that are to be used for
worship purposes,’ or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf.”97 These
examples are not about sectarian discrimination. Rather, they refer to worship
practices, protected as such by the Free Exercise Clause.
C. The Consequences of Justice Alito’s Flawed Interpretation
Justice Alito’s overbroad reading of the Free Exercise Clause leads inexorably
to a series of constitutional troubles, one piled on top of the other. First, it sweeps in
a vast range of human behavior that is subject to law, including employment
relations, family relations, and the duties of those who contract with the public. This
range is expanded yet further by the recent tendency to advance claims of religious
complicity, as way of resisting duties to others who exercise privacy rights,
reproductive rights, and marital rights in ways that some religious people oppose.98
Complicity claims arise in relationships, and contemporary life is thick with
relationships that invite one party to object to the behavior of others. Masterpiece
Cakeshop,99 Hobby Lobby, Inc. v. Burwell,100 and Fulton all arose out of such claims of
complicity.101
Second, Justice Alito here and elsewhere subscribes to an extremely
generous and subjective notion of what constitutes a substantial burden on religious
exercise. If religious exercise is confined to worship and preaching, courts can
measure objectively the extent to which a government policy interferes with that
Fulton, Alito slip op. at 25. Justice Barrett repeats this charge. Fulton, Barrett slip
op. at 1.
95 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
96 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
97 494 U.S. 877-878.
98 See generally Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, 124 Yale L. J. 2202 (2015)
(analyzing the political and legal contexts in which people seek exemptions from
laws that make “objectors complicit in the assertedly sinful conduct of others.”).
99 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 594 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2017).
100 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
101 Robin West describes these claims as ways that dissenters from egalitarian and
feminist norms seek to exit the social contract concerning equal opportunities for
all. Robin West, Freedom of the Church and Our Endangered Civil Rights: Exiting
the Social Contract, in Zoe Robinson, Chad Flanders and Micah Schwartzman (eds), The
Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty, Oxford University Press, 2015.
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exercise or imposes substantial costs on it.102 In contrast, the notion of burden as an
internal, subjective imposition on conscience cannot be second-guessed or
measured. Thomas v. Review Board103 pushed the idea of burden in this subjective
direction, and Alito’s opinion in Hobby Lobby amplified it.104 Other than an attack
(rarely attempted by the government) on the sincerity of belief, the government has
almost no way to successfully argue thatj an asserted burden on religious belief and
practice is insubstantial.105
Third, and directly related to the second, Alito’s opinion asserts that the
standard of review for exemption claims that “comes most readily to mind is the
standard that Smith replaced: A law that imposes a substantial burden on religious
exercise can be sustained only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest. “106 This pair of requirements – compelling interests, and the
requirement of narrow tailoring – are independently difficult to satisfy. Interests of
the government may be vital yet may fail the compelling interest test by falling just
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), involved just such a question. Justice
Brennan describes the loss of unemployment compensation for being unavailable
for work on Saturday (Adele Sherbert’s Sabbath day) as the conceptual equivalent of
a fine imposed upon her for Saturday worship. Id. at 404.
103 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
104 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 723-726 (accepting the assertion by the owners of
Hobby Lobby that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdens their religious
belief).
105 This problem is well-analyzed in Frederick Mark Gedicks, Substantial Burdens:
How Courts May (and Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 94 (2017). See also Lupu & Tuttle, note xx supra, at 241-244
(discussing how the ruling in Thomas effectively makes each religious exemption
claimant a judge in her own cause).
106 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Alito, J. concurring in the judgment at 73. He leaves
open the possibility that “this test [might be] rephrased or supplemented with
specific rules.” Id. This is a neat invitation to weasel out of the test when it
produces results with which a Justice is unhappy, as so often happened under the
Sherbert-Yoder regime. Moreover, Alito ignores the fact that Smith replaced a
bundle of standards, of which this was the among the strictest. Note as well that
Alito subtly shifts away from a test of “least restrictive means” to one of “narrow
tailoring,” even though RFRA (designed by Congress to reinstate pre-Smith law)
uses the test of least restrictive means. 42 U.S.C. sec 2000bb-1. The test of least
restrictive means is even more difficult to satisfy than that of “narrow tailoring,”
because the government can always find a means, albeit more expensive or less
efficient, less restrictive of religious liberty than the one challenged. See Hobby
Lobby, 573 at 764-768 (Ginsburg, J. , dissenting). See also Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby
and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 Harv. J. L. & Gender 35, 8690 (2015) (analyzing treatment of “least restrictive means” in Hobby Lobby and
elsewhere).
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short,107 or by being undercut by exceptions, however narrow, that weaken the
government’s claim about the weight of the interest.108
Requirements of narrow tailoring likewise are difficult to satisfy because the
government frequently has alternatives, albeit less efficient or more expensive, to
accomplish its goals. At times, the broader alternative may be far more effective at
achieving the government’s goals. For example, a complete ban on importation of a
prohibited substance, used in religious sacraments, is highly likely to work better
than monitoring the supply in the hands of a religious group.109
The combination of these three points – the breadth of what counts as an
exercise of religion; the ease of satisfying the “substantial burden” test; and the
difficulty of satisfying the tests of “narrow tailoring – compelling interest” -- is what
makes Alito’s approach so sweeping and unmanageable.
We know from extensive experience during the regime of Sherbert-Yoder that
courts will not stay on this path, even if they pretend to do so. In the 1980’s, faced
with a doctrine that made it nearly impossible for the government to deny an
exemption, the Court found multiple ways to work around the promise of
presumptive immunity for religious claims. By 1990, the Court had worked around
the Sherbert-Yoder standard far more often that it had applied that standard with
the promised rigor.110 The methods included weakening the doctrine in government
In Hobby Lobby, Alito implies that only the interest in avoiding racial
discrimination, and not other kinds of discrimination, is compelling. 573 U.S. at 733.
108 For this kind of reasoning about the connection between under-inclusion and the
weight of government interests, see Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao
do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at ___. Both are RFRA
decisions, but the statutory standard under RFRA tracks the free exercise standard
for which Alito contends in Fulton.
109 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418
(2006) (applying RFRA to exempt the group from a broad ban on importation of
huasca tea, because the government could take the more narrowly tailored step of
monitoring the group’s use of the hallucinogenic substance).
110 In the Fulton briefing, lawyers calling for Smith to be overruled conveniently
ignored these work-around cases, because the pattern disturbs their preferred (but
false) narrative that Smith abruptly abandoned a consistent posture of strict
scrutiny of free exercise exemption claims. But we called attention to them in our
amicus brief in Fulton, note 1 supra, at 12-16. Justice Barrett (a former Scalia clerk)
was definitely attuned to them. Fulton, Barrett opinion at 2. For additional
discussion, see Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious
Exemptions, 38 Harv. J. L. & Gender 35, 51-53 (2015); Michael W. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109. 1110 (1990)
(describing Supreme Court’s free exercise law on the eve of Smith as a “Potemkin
doctrine”).
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controlled enclaves such as prisons111 and the military;112 refining the concept of
burdens to exclude difficult cases, such as those brought by Native Americans with
respect to sacred lands;113 and weakening the compelling interest test to make it
easier to satisfy.114 Lower courts did likewise.115 All of these moves produced
significant departures from rule of law values of consistency and predictability in
application of the law. Why should we expect anything different now?
Fourth, Alito’s broad conception of free exercise, coupled with his assertion
of a strict judicial standard to govern such claims, reveals the deep flaws in his
structural argument about the constitutional treatment of speech, press, and
association compared to religion. With respect to coverage, rights of speech, press,
and association all relate to human activities of communication. This is a broad
subject indeed, but it is miniscule when compared with the entire universe of
human behavior, all of which may be touched by religious conviction.
When a news organization, for example, enters into employment relations, or
constructs a building in which to create its product, no one asserts that the First
Amendment imposes strict standards on the government’s regulation of such
activity. With respect to such matters, if government regulates news organizations
to the same extent as other, comparable entities – that is, if the regulations are
speech-neutral and generally applicable – the First Amendment has no work to do.
By contrast, those who want to overturn Smith in free exercise cases assert that the
incidental impacts of any regulation of religiously motivated actors must be justified
under strict, government-limiting standards. If free exercise meant worship
activities and not the entirety of religiously motivated acts, the structural gap
between religion and other First Amendment protected activity would shrink
dramatically.

O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
113 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). See
also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Sec’y of
Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
114 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983). In both decisions, the Court failed to inquire into the availability of
means less restrictive of religious liberty.
115 See James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1407, 1416-1437 (1992). Indeed, with the
benefit of hindsight, we can see that almost all of the successful free exercise
exemption claims in this period involved both unemployment compensation and
questions involving worship. Yoder and Thomas are the outliers. Both involve
religiously motivated conduct outside of worship, and both have been the source of
great controversy. Perhaps, intuitively, the Supreme Court was leaning toward a
notion of free exercise as worship without ever so declaring.
111
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Furthermore, with respect to standards of review, no Justice or scholar has
ever contended that a single, highly potent review standard should govern every
possible dispute arising from regulation of communicative activity. When
government regulates the content of communication, it must answer to the highest
constitutional concerns.116 In contrast, when government regulates the time, place,
and manner of expression, the relevant standards are more relaxed.117 When the
regulation takes the form of control of expressive conduct, and the government has
an interest in the conduct independent of the message it sends, the standards are
quite lenient indeed.118 Most generally, free speech principles do not protect speech
against “incidental burdens” from generally applicable, speech-neutral laws. 119
These latter categories – regulation of conduct generally, speech-neutrally,
and independent of the message it sends – is a precise analogue for generally
applicable standards that apply to all behavior of a certain kind, religiously
motivated or not. When Alito and others call for strict scrutiny in such cases, they
are demanding special treatment for religion, not treatment equal to that afforded
other constitutional rights.120
Many of the concerns expressed in Justice Barrett’s brief concurring opinion
can be instructively linked to one or more of the problems that emerge from Alito’s
overbroad conception of what the constitution means by the exercise of religion.
Her opinion asks why the Free Exercise Clause, alone among First Amendment
rights, should be limited to concerns about discrimination. The answer is that the
Clause is not so limited. It protects the activities of worship and preaching the Word
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312 !988).
117 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
118 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In cases evaluating contentneutral restrictions on conduct that involves symbolic speech, this Court has
consistently ruled that government actions were constitutionally permissible
despite incidental limitations on some expressive activity. In addition to O’Brien,
see, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991); City of Erie v. Pap’s
A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000).
119 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (“[G]enerally
applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their
enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to collect and
report the news.” (collecting cases)); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972)
(“It is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental
burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal
statutes of general applicability.”)
120 The gap between protection of religious speech and all other speech under such
an approach is constitutionally unacceptable. See William P. Marshall, What is the
Matter with Equality? An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and
Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 Ind. L. J.193 (2000).
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as strenuously as it protects political advocacy, but it does not protect everything
done in the name of religion.
Justice Barrett is “skeptical about swapping Smith’s categorical
antidiscrimination approach for an equally categorical strict scrutiny regime,
particularly when this Court’s resolution of conflicts between generally applicable
laws and other First Amendment rights—like speech and assembly—has been much
more nuanced.” This skepticism is appropriate, but far too weak, because Alito’s
conception of the exercise of religion is so much broader than any judicial
conception of what counts as the exercise of these other rights. 121
Justice Barrett goes on to raise a series of concerns, at least some of which
arise entirely from unasked and unanswered questions about the breadth of free
exercise rights. For instance, she asks whether “. . . entities like Catholic Social
Services—which is an arm of the Catholic Church— [should] be treated differently
than individuals?”122 A better understanding of the constitutional meaning of the
exercise of religion would lead to a related, but different question – whether
Catholic Social Services is exercising religion in the constitutional sense when it
provides social services to the general public. Of course, CSS is motivated by
religion, and understands itself in religious terms, but that cannot transform all of
its daily activities into the kind of religious exercise protected by the First
Amendment.123
Several of her questions about review standards emerge from the same concern
about whether courts will consistently ask the same, strict questions about
regulatory impacts on religion. See Barrett, slip op. at 2: “What forms of scrutiny
should apply? Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 403 (1963) (assessing
whether government’s interest is ‘compelling’), with Gillette v. United States, 401U.
S. 437, 462 (1971) (assessing whether government’s interest is ‘substantial’);”and
“Should there be a distinction between indirect and direct burdens on religious
exercise?, Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 606–607 (1961) (plurality
opinion).”
122 Justice Barrett added the citation: “Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171 (2012).” Barrett, slip op. at 2. As we
discuss in Part I, Hosanna-Tabor does not declare a general doctrine of privilege or
autonomy for religious entities. Rather, the decision reinforces the concept of
judicial abstention on exclusively ecclesiastical questions. Perhaps Justice Barrett
intends the “Cf,” signal as a very shorthand way to communicate that distinction.
123 Religiously affiliated hospitals, serving the general public, are in the same boat as
religious charities. They should not be free to claim mandatory free exercise clause
protection for their refusal to provide necessary services to women or to
transgender patients. Their status may soon get tested in the Supreme Court. See
Dignity Health v. Minton, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 20-1135, cert. petition filed, March
13, 2020, materials available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/191135/138108/20200313135611202_Dignity%20Health%20Appendix.pdf. For a
121
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Justice Barrett’s final question about review standards is especially pointed:
[“I]f the answer is strict scrutiny, would pre-Smith cases rejecting free exercise
challenges to garden-variety laws come out the same way?”124 This question is
telling, in two respects. First, she is acknowledging, __ as Alito, CSS, and its amici do
not __the pervasive pattern of work-arounds in pre-Smith law. Second, her
reference to “garden variety laws” shows an acknowledgment of the scope of
exemptions encompassed by Alito’s broad notion of free exercise. They would
include generally applicable tax laws, labor laws, social welfare policy, land use
control, and other areas of regulation not aimed at the experience of worship.
Justice Alito’s opinion invited these questions, and Justices Barrett,
Kavanaugh, and Breyer deserve praise for raising them. The opinion of Justice
Barrett, who is a former Scalia clerk, builds on the legacy of his opinion in Smith. As
a result, and despite the few lonely voices speaking up in defense of Smith, the
decision endures. The lower courts remain bound by it. The Supreme Court has
neither the incentive nor sufficient interest among the current Justices to take it up
again quickly.125 Without a workable alternative, the Smith framework for
adjudication of Free Exercise cases will remain in place. And if religious exercise is
understood in Alito’s broad terms, there is no workable alternative.
D. The Scope of “General Applicability”
The one major inroad on the regime of Smith is the apparent narrowing of
what counts as a generally applicable law. Two major developments point in this
direction – 1) the Court’s treatment, in its emergency docket, of orders limiting
attendance at houses of worship during the Covid 19 pandemic, and 2) the Court’s
analysis in Fulton of the role of administrative discretion in undermining the general
applicability of the law. Taken to their logical ends, these developments suggest that
the category of generally applicable laws will shrink to the vanishing point, and
Smith will become irrelevant.126 The experience of courts with the pre-Smith law,
however, suggests a different fate.
sophisticated discussion of related issues, see Elizabeth Sepper, Zombie Religious
Institutions, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 929 (2018).
124 “See Smith, 494 U. S., at 888–889.” Barrett, slip op. at 2. At the cited pages from
Smith Justice Scalia listed the many Free Exercise work around cases from the
1980’s.
125 Soon after Fulton, the Court denied certiorari in two cases that had raised the
issue of overruling Smith. Ricks v. Idaho Contractor Board, U.S. Sup. Ct., No. 19-66,
cert. denied, June 28, 2021; and Arlene’s Flowers v. Washington, 443 P.3d 1203 (Wa.
2019), cert. denied, xxx S. Ct. xxx (No, 19-333 July 2, 2021). Justices Alito, Gorsuch,
and Thomas noted that they would grant certiorari In Arlene’s Flowers.
126 Linda Greenhouse, What the Supreme Court Did for Religion, New York Times,
July 1, 2021, available here:
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The Covid cases and the significance of secular exceptions. As recently as the
summer of 2020, the Court’s most prominently expressed view about the concept of
general applicability remained its opinion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
Hialeah.127 Failures of general applicability were to be found only in invidious and
hostile departures from even-handed treatment of all religions and their secular
counterparts. Such departures demonstrate deliberate discrimination against
religion generally, or (as in Lukumi) a particular religion.
When the first Covid cases arising from state limitations on attendance at
houses of worship appeared at the Court in July of 2020, a narrow majority led by
Chief Justice Roberts adhered to the Lukumi approach. In South Bay United
Pentecostal Church v. Newsom,128 the Court refused to issue an emergency stay of
court orders imposing a limit on attendance, on the ground that the state had
treated houses of worship the same as the appropriate comparators. As Chief
Justice Roberts explained, the right comparators included “lectures, concerts, movie
showings, spectator sports and theatrical performances, where large groups of
people gather in close proximity for extended periods of time.”129 And, as Roberts
continued, “the Order exempts or treats more leniently only dissimilar activities,
such as operating grocery stores, banks, and laundromats, in which people neither
congregate in large groups nor remain in close proximity for extended periods.”130
The notions of similarity and dissimilarity were driven, quite appropriately, by the
state’s expert assessment of public health risks.
By November of 2020, however, Justice Ginsburg had passed away and had
been replaced by Justice Barrett. The 5-4 majority that had controlled the outcome
in the summer of 2020 became a 5-4 majority in support of a far more aggressive
attitude toward rejecting findings of general applicability. In Roman Catholic
Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,131 and later in Tandon v. Newsom,132 the new majority
asserted that religious gatherings had a presumptive right to be treated as well as
the state treated the most favored secular gatherings, such as retail establishments
and factories. The state’s justifications for the different treatment, grounded in
expert opinion on the risk of spreading Covid-19, vanished in this approach.
This new formulation of what constituted a failure of general applicability
threatened the Smith regime. If any secular exception, however well grounded in
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/01/opinion/supreme-courtreligion.html?action=click&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage.
127 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
128 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020).
129 Id. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
130 Id.. See also Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley, 591 U.S. ___ (2020) (upholding similar
Nevada orders with respect to gatherings at houses of worship).
131 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020)
132 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021).
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considerations of policy or legislative decisions about coverage of a law, undermines
general applicability, religious claimants would be able to seek exemptions from a
new and wide variety of laws of many different kinds.133
It is far too soon to know whether this “most favored nation” approach to
general applicability will take firm hold across the entire range of religious
exemption claims, but we see reasons to be skeptical of that likelihood. First, and
true to our conviction that restrictions on worship are at the core of the free
exercise guarantee, the Covid 19 cases all involve limitations on group worship, and
therefore implicate the most acute constitutional concern.134 Second, as a matter of
process, the Covid 19 cases all arose in the Court’s emergency docket, and so were
not subject to full briefing and oral argument. This may help explain why none of
the Justices who joined in the Court opinion, including Kavanaugh and Barrett, even
mentions the Covid decisions in Fulton.
More substantively, note that where strict review of religious exemption
claims is triggered by the presence of a secular exception, the government will
inevitably lose. The very presence of any exception demonstrates that the
government interest in denying a religious exception falls short of compelling.135
Perhaps the majority in Fulton, determined to avoid overruling Smith, stuck together
and chose not to advance a theory of general applicability that would make Smith
mostly irrelevant, and tilt the constitutional scales heavily toward every religious
For defense of the “most favored nation” theory, see, e.g., Douglas Laycock &
Steven T. Collins, Generally Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of Religion, 95
Neb. L. Rev. 1 (2016). For critique of this approach, see James Oleske, Lukumi at
Twenty: Legacy of Uncertainty for Religious Liberty and Animal Welfare Laws, 19
ANIMAL L. REV. 295 (2013). For a constitutionally expansive and more mixed
evaluation of the approach, see Nelson Tebbe, The Principle and Politics of Equal
Value, 121 Colum. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2021); available here:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3885108 . See also
Christopher G. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: The General Applicability
Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 Harv. J. L. & P.P. 627 (2003).
134 Note the Court’s treatment of the decision in Kentucky ex rel. Danville Christian
Academy, Inc. v. Beshear, 981 F.3d 505 (2020), which involved restrictions on inperson attendance at elementary and secondary schools, religious and secular. The
state had not imposed equally demanding restrictions on pre-schools or institutions
of higher education, so a “most favored nation” argument was available in this case,
but the Court did not deploy it. See 592 U.S. ___ (2020), reported here:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20a96_e29g.pdf.
135 Fulton, slip op. at 14-15. In O Centro, a RFRA case, the Supreme Court used this
move, in which underinclusive coverage of a policy is fatal to the government when
the policy is challenged for not exempting religiously motivated conduct. See O
Centro, 546 U.S. at 433. For discussion of why the Court did not invoke this idea in
Hobby Lobby, despite its availability, see Lupu, Dubious Enterprise, 38 Harv, J. L. &
Gender38, at 82-86.
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claimant.
Fulton and the relevance of administrative discretion. If we have correctly
sized up the silence in Fulton with respect to the “most favored nation” approach to
general applicability, what is to be made of the Fulton Court’s reliance on
administrative discretion as the factor that undermines general applicability in this
case? As we discuss in Part I, the discretion on which the Court relies in Fulton had
never been exercised in the context of permitting social welfare agencies to refuse to
screen particular classes of prospective foster parents. Such agencies, for example,
could not screen only parents whose faith matched the agency’s faith commitments,
although such preferences are not uncommon.136
The analogy on which the Court relies in Fulton is to the unemployment
compensation context. In Sherbert v. Verner, the state agency was engaged in
making decisions about whether a claimant had “good cause” to refuse available
work. As the Court in Smith viewed that context, it “lent itself to individualized
governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct. . . . [A] distinctive
feature of unemployment compensation programs is that their eligibility criteria
invite consideration of the particular circumstances behind an applicant's
unemployment. . . . [O]ur decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the
proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it
may not refuse to extend that system to cases of "religious hardship" without
compelling reason.”137
The system in Fulton looked nothing like the system described in Sherbert.
Philadelphia had no process in place for evaluating the reasons why private
contracting agencies might want exceptions from non-discrimination requirements.
The City had created no such exceptions as a matter of substance. The possibility of
the “Commissioner’s discretion” appeared to be a piece of administrative
boilerplate, not a product of a policy judgment about the possibilities of “good
cause” to ignore anti-discrimination rules that govern the screening of prospective
parents.
As we argued in Part I, Fulton’s treatment of this grant of discretion was a
convenience, a way to allow the Court to rule in favor of CSS without addressing the
See Rogers v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Svcs., Civil Action No. 6-19-cv-01567TMC (D.S.C. 5/8/2020) (Plaintiffs claimed that the federal and state defendants
violated the Establishment Clause by contracting with a faith-based foster care
agency that refused to place children in any homes that did not conform to the
requirements of the agency’s religious beliefs and practices. The court has
dismissed defendants’ motions to dismiss the case and the matter remains in
discovery.) Although federal and state laws and regulations prohibit contractors
from discriminating based on religion, the then-Secretary of HHS and Governor of
South Carolina granted waivers to permit the contract at issue.
137 494 U.S. at 884.
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question of whether Smith should be overruled. But this move, if not cabined,
threatens to do as much or more harm as that overruling might do. In the world of
administrative agencies – especially at the state and local level -- the use of waivers,
enforcement discretion, and other ways of creating exceptions to policy is
commonplace. More generally, codes and widespread understandings of
administrative procedure may include the use of discretion as a tool of agency
policy-making.
In addition, large bodies of law administered by judges, rather than agencies,
similarly incorporate devices for the exercise of discretion as a way of mitigating
harsh, unjust, or constitutionally troubling results. Judges may choose to construe
statutes in ways that avoid conflicts with religion, and they may similarly choose to
apply general doctrines of equity to avoid hardships produced by religious beliefs,
especially in matters involving care and custody of children.
At times, and quite appropriately, administrative and judicial discretion may
be exercised in favor of claims of religious accommodation. Recognizing an absence
from school or work on grounds of religious need, for example, may be fair and
appropriate. Constitutional norms do not preclude such recognition when they are
not designed to advance particular faiths and when they cause no significant harm
to others.138
Treating a grant of unexercised discretion as fatal to a claim of general
applicability, however, goes well beyond the notion that administrators (or judges)
may choose to permissibly accommodate religious claimants. In Fulton, the Court
treated the grant of discretion to the Commissioner as the beginning and end of the
case in favor of CSS. Discretion supposedly made the norm of non-discrimination
not generally applicable, and simultaneously defeated any argument from the City
that it had a compelling interest in denying the sought-after religious exemption.
This was a way for the Court to put Fulton behind it, but its circularity is obvious,
and should not be the basis for free exercise adjudication going forward.
CONCLUSION
Fulton is a signal to lower court judges and litigants that the regime of Smith,
in general terms, survived challenge and remains intact. If judges see it in that light,
they will be loathe to make Smith disappear through the device of finding most laws
and regulations not generally applicable. To be sure, free exercise claimants will
aggressively push these theories. Judges will occasionally find cases that seem
sympathetic on the side of free exercise claimants, and search for ways to make use
See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (recognizing
duty of religious accommodation in the private workplace under Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, so long as the accommodation produces no more than de
minimis harm to employer or other employees).
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of such devices and rule in favor of religion. We expect that many of these cases will
involve clashes between conservative religious groups or individuals and LGBT
rights, a context in which both Masterpiece Cakeshop and Fulton unfortunately have
created licenses to lean towards religious claims.
But judges will also see many religious claims that they do not find
sympathetic, as well as cases in which the risk of materially undermining important
government interests will loom large. These cases will appear in the context of
criminal law, tort law, child welfare law, marriage and divorce law, labor and
employment law, and administrative regulation of almost very kind. This is the state
of affairs against which Justice Scalia warned in Smith, a warning to which Justices
Barrett, Kavanaugh, and Breyer appeared sensitive in Fulton.
Lower courts, and the Supreme Court itself, repeatedly worked around this
threat in the years between Yoder and Smith. This time around, we expect that
lower courts will find ways to resist the move toward shrinking the category of
generally applicable laws, because the alternative will be to allow religious
claimants to be, again and again, a law unto themselves. We recognize the
instability of the current moment in Free Exercise jurisprudence, but we remain
confident that wiser heads, whether or not more plentiful, will continue to prevail.
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